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ABSTRACT: Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important 
changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even characterized as a sort of 
Kuhnian scientific revolution. In this paper, the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolu-
tions will be analysed. It will be suggested that the way in which interdisciplinarity is promoted looks simi-
lar to how new paradigms were described and defended in some episodes of revolutionary scientific change. 
However, contrary to what happens during some scientific revolutions, the rhetoric with which interdisci-
plinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by a strong agreement about what interdisciplinar-
ity actually is. In the end, contemporary interdisciplinarity could be defined as being in a ‘pre-paradigmatic’ 
phase, with the very talk promoting interdisciplinarity being a possible obstacle to its maturity.
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RESUMEN: La investigación contemporánea sobre la interdisciplinariedad es descrita a menudo como si 
implicara cambios importantes en la estructura y fines de la empresa científica. A veces es incluso caracteri-
zada como una forma de revolución científica kuhniana. En este artículo se analizará la analogía entre la 
interdisciplinariedad y las revoluciones científicas. Se sugerirá que el modo en que se promueve la interdisci-
plinariedad es similar al modo en que se describe y defiende un nuevo paradigma en algunos episodios de cam-
bio científico revolucionario. Sin embargo, al contrario de lo que sucede durante las revoluciones científicas, la 
retórica con la que se promueve la interdisciplinariedad no parece venir acompañada por un fuerte acuerdo 
acerca de lo que es realmente dicha interdisciplinariedad. En definitiva, la interdisciplinariedad contempo-
ránea se encuentra en una fase pre-paradigmática, siendo un posible obstáculo para su madurez el discurso 
mismo que promueve la interdisciplinariedad.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important 
changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even charac-
terized as a sort of Kuhnian scientific revolution. But is interdisciplinarity really bringing a 
revolution into science?
In this paper, I take the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolu-
tions seriously. The way in which interdisciplinarity is described and promoted will be 
analysed by using the tools developed by historians and philosophers of science to study 
scientific change. Such an analysis will allow me to assess the extent, but also the limits, 
of the changes that interdisciplinarity could bring into science.
In §2, I will briefly examine the definition(s) of interdisciplinarity. In §3, I show how 
interdisciplinarity is described as bringing a revolutionary change into the structure of sci-
ence. In §4, I specify which kind of revolution, if any, interdisciplinarity could bring into sci-
ence. I will suggest that interdisciplinarity could lead to something similar to those episodes 
of scientific change, such as the transition from the Aristotelian to the Galilean conception 
of science, which involved the whole disciplinary structure of science rather than one single 
discipline. In §5 I will discuss some disanalogies between scientific revolutions and interdis-
ciplinarity. It will be argued that, contrary to what happens with some scientific revolutions, 
the rhetoric with which interdisciplinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by 
a strong agreement about what interdisciplinarity actually is. I conclude, in §6, by character-
ising contemporary interdisciplinarity as being in a ‘pre-paradigmatic’ phase and by claiming 
that the talk about interdisciplinarity may actually be an obstacle to its maturity.
2. What is interdisciplinarity?
One of the problems of interdisciplinarity is its definition. As recently pointed out by 
Hoffmann et al. (2013, 1857), ‘interdisciplinarity’ has been a ‘buzzword’ for the last four 
or five decades, despite the lack of a consensus about its precise meaning.
The literature on the topic usually distinguishes between multidisciplinarity (the co-
ordinated effort of different disciplines to solve a shared problem from their own perspec-
tive), interdisciplinarity (the integration of different disciplines, at a theoretical or meth-
odological level) and transdisciplinarity (an approach which transcends the boundaries 
between natural and social sciences, and even questions the very idea of a scientific disci-
plines) – see, among the others, Choi and Pak 2006; Holbrook 2013; Klein 1990, 2010.
Prima facie, it looks like ‘integration’ is the key-element for distinguishing interdisci-
plinarity from other forms of poly-disciplinary research. This view is explicitly defended 
by Klein, who claims that “[t]he only true interdisciplinarity is integrated interdisciplinar-
ity, [in which] the concepts and insights of one discipline contribute to the problems and 
theories of another” (Klein 1990, 20). More recently, a similar view has also been endorsed 
by the authors of the widely cited report of the National Academy of the Sciences (NAS), 
who define interdisciplinarity as
a mode of research by teams or individuals that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, 
perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized 
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knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are be-
yond the scope of a single discipline or area of research practice. (NAS 2005, 2)
It has been argued, however, that not every interdisciplinary interaction leads to success-
ful integration (Grüne-Yanoff 2016). Many of such interdisciplinary collaborations may 
simply make use or leading to the production of ‘model templates’ (Knuuttila and Loett-
gers 2016), ‘repertoires’ (Ankeny and Leonelli 2016), or ‘migrating models’ (Bradley and 
Thébault 2017).
Moreover, rather than different kinds of activities, multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinar-
ity and transdisciplinarity could be simply regarded as different stages of the same process: 
a scientific research may begin with the involvement of different disciplines, which, with 
time, may get integrated and, eventually, may end up breaking disciplinary boundaries. 
This may be the reason for why some of these terms, especially ‘inter-’ and ‘transdisciplinar-
ity’, are often used interchangeably.
Since this paper is not concerned with the definition and classification of the different 
types of scientific activity, it will follow the common trend which defines ‘interdisciplinar-
ity’ and ‘interdisciplinary research’ in a rather loose sense, to indicate all the types of scien-
tific research involving more than one discipline.
3. Is interdisciplinarity revolutionary?
Interdisciplinarity is not a recent phenomenon in the history of science. Many scientific 
disciplines, like biochemistry, emerged from the interdisciplinary work conducted in the 
area of partial overlapping of two or more pre-existing disciplines. What is recent is a cer-
tain way to talk about interdisciplinarity.
In recent years, interdisciplinarity has started to be viewed as the best way for solving 
urgent, complex and global problems. Considered to be capable to solve more—or, at least, 
different—problems than traditional mono-disciplinary research, interdisciplinarity is of-
ten viewed as bringing a fundamental change in science. More specifically, interdisciplinar-
ity is described as changing how knowledge is produced, as well as the kind of knowledge 
which is produced.
Gibbons et al. (1994) and Nowotny et al. (2001), for example, introduce the concept 
of ‘Mode-2 knowledge production’. Contrary to the traditional discipline-bounded Mode-
1, Mode-2 challenges the internalist ideal of a pure scientific activity, solely concerned 
with its own esoteric problems, and, instead, takes place within the three-folded helix of 
science-society-institutions. Interdisciplinarity, therefore, is considered to be capable of 
breaking the boundaries among scientific disciplines, as well as between science, on the one 
hand, and public institutions and society, on the other.
It has also been maintained that a new form of knowledge—that is, ‘mutual knowl-
edge’—“emerges as novel insights are generated, disciplinary relationships redefined, and 
integrative frameworks built” (Klein 2008, 119). Recently, interdisciplinarity has been de-
fined as providing “a vibrant new dimension of knowledge production” (Frodeman et al. 
2010, iv).
Although it is not entirely clear ‘how’ such a new kind of knowledge is actually pro-
duced, or to ‘what’ it amounts to, it is undeniable that the recent talk surrounding interdis-
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ciplinarity describes it as bringing a radical change in science. Sometimes, it is even charac-
terised as being somehow analogous to what Kuhn defines as ‘scientific revolutions’.
Kuhn (1996/[1962]), it is worth remembering, develops a cyclic model of the 
growth of science in which periods of normal science are disrupted by so- called scientific 
revolutions. During periods of normal science, the scientific activity is guided by a domi-
nant paradigm, which comprises theoretical and metaphysical assumptions, values, prob-
lem-solving methods, and upon which the members of the scientific community main-
tain a consensus. In virtue of such a consensus, scientists can work on the resolution of 
the problems posed and in the ways dictated by the paradigm itself, without question-
ing the foundations of the scientific enterprise at every step. When scientists face a high 
number of recalcitrant problems, the consensus upon the paradigm may break. This sit-
uation may lead to a crisis, which in turn opens the way to a period of extraordinary (or 
‘non-normal’) research, during which alternative paradigms are taken into consideration. 
The revolution is completed when the scientific community finally reaches a consensus 
upon a new paradigm, which overthrows the old one, and marks the beginning of a new 
period of normal research. A scientific revolution can be then described as a ‘paradigm 
shift’. The pre- and post-revolution paradigms are deemed by Kuhn as incommensurable, 
because they lack a ‘common measure’ for the objective comparison of their theoretical 
languages, methodologies and world-views. This is, in a nutshell, Kuhn’s model of scien-
tific revolutions.
Some scholars employ the Kuhnian jargon to characterise interdisciplinarity. Fun-
towicz and Ravetz (1993), for instance, talk about ‘post-normal science’, with reference 
to the scientific research conducted under risk and in a situation in which “facts [are] 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1993, 735). This is not the place to analyse and assess the concept of post-normal sci-
ence, as many have already done—see, for example, Turnpenny et  al. (2011). Further-
more, it must be stressed that post-normal science is not the same thing of, nor it can be 
completely reduced to, interdisciplinarity. It is true, however, that a great deal of inter-
disciplinary research—such as, for instance, the research about global climate change or 
about ecological issues—could be easily labelled as ‘post-normal’ in the Funtowicz and 
Ravetz’s sense. For the present purposes, it is enough to highlight how the very expres-
sion ‘post-normal science’ clearly echoes the Kuhnian jargon, to the point that it would 
be legitimate to wonder whether what Funtowicz and Ravetz are talking about is, in a 
way or in another, a form of ‘revolutionary science’.
More recently, an explicit connection between the Kuhnian concept of a scientific rev-
olution and interdisciplinarity has been made by Pohl et al. (2008) who argue that inter- 
and transdisciplinary science are inherently revolutionary. Repko and Szostak (2008) fur-
thermore explain:
The Kuhnian distinction between revolutionary and normal science was undoubtedly over-
drawn and has now been supplanted in the study of science by more recent debates. [...] However, 
the Kuhnian distinction has useful implications for the present discussion [on interdisciplinar-
ity]. Scholars closely following disciplinary methodologies would clearly fall within the ‘normal 
science’ category. Inter- disciplinarians are more likely to celebrate grand new syntheses that set 
scholars on entirely new research trajectory: these would qualify as ‘revolutionary science’. (Repko 
and Szostak 2008, 6)
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It must be specified that talking about interdisciplinarity in the context of theories of scien-
tific change and revolutions is not a novelty. In fact, many scholars consider that scientific 
revolutions come together with interdisciplinary practice. It has been argued, for example, 
that the strict disciplinary structure of medieval university was not fit for driving scientific 
progress. In fact, “[t]he scientific revolution happened for the most part outside the univer-
sities. [...] The term ‘Renaissance man’ is apposite: these people were not specialists in a dis-
cipline, but dabbled in various branches of knowledge” (Turner 2010, 16). 
Kuhn (1993) himself seemed to agree on this point. In part influenced by the work of 
Wise (1993), who examines the interconnection between the practices of different scien-
tific fields, as well as within scientific fields and a larger cultural milieu, he realised that, for 
example, an episode such as the so-called Chemical Revolution was made possible by devel-
opments in physics.
The aim of this paper, however, is not to examine the potential role of interdiscipli-
nary research in scientific revolutions. Rather, in the following sections it will be examined 
whether contemporary interdisciplinary research, by and in itself, is bringing a sort of revo-
lution into science.
4. The Anthropology of Revolutionary Scientific Changes
It may be objected that the analogy between interdisciplinary science and scientific revo-
lutions is superficial or even misleading and that, therefore, it should be ignored. In fact, 
while a Kuhnian revolution is the replacement of an old paradigm with a new one within 
a discipline, such as physics or chemistry, interdisciplinarity seems to change, or, at least, 
to question the boundaries of the disciplinary structure of science. As some historians and 
philosophers of science have shown, however, it is possible to use the Kuhnian machinery 
to describe episodes of revolutionary scientific changes affecting the structure of science as 
a whole.
One of such episodes is the transition between the Aristotelian and the Galilean sci-
ence. Such a transition did not involve theoretical changes within a particular discipline. In 
fact, the so-called Aristotelians cannot be attached just to metaphysics, physics, mathemat-
ics, astronomy or poetics, but to the whole bunch of disciplines forming Aristotle’s com-
plex disciplinary system. Similarly, the so-called Galileans did not attack a specific theory or 
discipline but, rather, they challenged the principles behind the dominant hierarchy of the 
sciences.
This episode is analysed from a Kuhnian perspective by Biagioli (1990), in his clas-
sic paper The Anthropology of Incommensurability. Biagioli is not interested in the formal 
and ‘synchronic’ analysis of the incommensurability between two competing paradigms, 
but, rather, in the ‘diachronic’ emergence of communication failures. He wants to show 
how the communication breakdowns which, for Kuhn, are occasionally experienced by 
the supporters of two competing paradigms during a scientific revolution do not depend 
only on the logical and semantic features of a pair of conflicting theoretical languages. 
Rather, for Biagioli, the breakdowns in cross-paradigmatic communication may be 
caused by the behaviour of the very participants of the communication. More than with 
issues of meaning change and ontological discontinuity, incommensurability may have to 
do with the rhetorics and ambitions of two competing intellectual communities. This is 
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why Biagioli defines his own work as an ‘anthropological’ study of scientific revolutions 
and incommensurability.
In Biagioli’s view, the debates between Aristotelians and Galileans were not character-
ized by a genuine lack of mutual understanding but, rather, by the unwillingness of the two 
parties to communicate and understand the respective opponents.
The Aristotelian philosophers tended to be dismissive of Galileo’s views in a rather a 
priori fashion. Such an attitude was driven by the dominant conception of science of the 
time. Up until then, and under the long lasting Aristotelian paradigm, science was consid-
ered to be, essentially, the study of qualities. Within this framework, philosophical specu-
lation occupied the top position in the hierarchy of knowledge. In short: it is not like the 
Aristotelian philosophers disagreed with Galileo because they misunderstood him; rather, 
they did not want to communicate with him, because they did not consider him to be a real 
scientist to begin with.
As a reaction, Galileo and the Galileans exasperated the quantitative and mathemat-
ical aspects of their writings. They adopted, that is, a ‘mathematical elitism’, which deep-
ened the communication divide with their rivals. This behaviour is epitomized by Galileo’s 
Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, in which the characters of Sagredo and Salviati, 
representing the Galilean perspective, actually ridicule the simple-minded Simplicio, who 
represents a straw-manned and caricatural version of the Aristotelian philosopher. Galileo 
employs the so-called ‘epideiectic’, or ‘ceremonial’, rhetoric, which assumes that the audi-
ence is already sympathetic with the theses which are supposed to be proven. This is why, 
at a closer look, Galileo’s Dialogue is anything but a genuine dialogue (Biagioli 1990, 185-
191).
The controversy between Galileo and the Aristotelians also possessed an ethical di-
mension. For Galileo, the Aristotelians’ stubbornness to ignore mathematics was immoral, 
a sign of their unwillingness to track the truth. For the Aristotelians, Galileo was sim-
ply too narcissist and too busy collecting new facts rather than trying to understand them 
properly. The lack of communication between Galileans and Aristotelians, therefore, was 
symptomatic of deep differences between the professional ethos of the two groups.
At the basis of the behaviour of both Aristotelians and Galileans there was a compe-
tition for academic prestige and recognition. Up until the Rennaissance, the Aristotelian 
doctrine had been considered as ‘the’ science. Aristotelians occupied all the academic po-
sitions and a university career was simply precluded to those who did not follow the dom-
inant paradigm. Mathematics was considered to be a lesser science and, as a consequence, 
mathematicians struggled to enter academia. Indeed, Galileo managed to pursue his re-
search from outside academia and thanks to the patronage—which, from a contemporary 
perspective, could be considered as a sort of ‘private funding’—of the de’ Medici family (Bi-
agioli 1993). Given the climate of the time, it appears obvious that the Galileans attempted 
to ridicule the Aristotelian approach in order to breach into academia, while the Aristoteli-
ans dismissed the Galilean method in order to protect their position.
It would be far too easy, however, to dismiss the deadlock between the Aristotelians 
and the Galileans as a mere sociological phenomenon, which should be of no concern to 
philosophers interested in the epistemic elements of science. One of the issues arising from 
the phenomenon of scientific revolutions is how to make sense of the so-called ‘prospective 
rationality’, in virtue of which scientists end up supporting a new paradigm which is not 
fully developed and not fully confirmed yet, but which comes to be accepted for extra-em-
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18864 243
The interdisciplinarity revolution
pirical reasons. The sociological and rhetorical aspects of the conflict among competing 
professional groups cannot be disentangled from the epistemological problem of choosing 
the best paradigm. In fact, such extra-epistemological aspects can actually drive and facili-
tate the choice. As Biagioli points out, “the legitimation of radically new theories or world 
views may require revolutions in the social hierarchy of disciplines and the emergence of 
new socio-professional groups” (Biagioli 1990, 188).1
In short, following Biagioli, it is easy to see how neither the Artistotelians nor the Gal-
ileans really wanted to engage in a genuine conversation, and how both groups developed 
rhetorical strategies to discredit or diminish the adversary. Such a stubbornness and refusal 
to communicate, fueled by a good dose of epideiectic rhetoric, moralism and desire of pro-
fessional recognition, cemented the sense of communitarian identity and the cohesion of 
both the Aristotelians and the Galileans. In turn, the formation of such a strong sense of 
communitarian identity—which facilitated the communication among the members of the 
same community, but prevented it among the members of different communities–allowed 
the further articulation and refinement of the very theories around which the two conflict-
ing paradigms had been developed. Therefore, the rhetoric-fuelled communication divide 
played a positive epistemic role, because it pushed for an improvement and a refinement of 
the two conflicting views.
If, as it is claimed by many, contemporary interdisciplinarity is bringing a revolution 
into science, then such a revolution involves the disciplinary structure of science as a whole, 
not just a change of theory within a particular discipline. Therefore, it is possible to see 
whether the ways such a change is implemented conforms to Biagioli’s model.
Similarly to what happens during some revolutions, interdisciplinarity is not always 
or not only endorsed on the basis of empirical data in favor of its success. Some interdisci-
plinary collaborations have been successful; the results of other interdisciplinary projects, 
however, are yet to be seen. That some specific interdisciplinary projects worked well in the 
past, however, is not a sufficient reason to think that interdisciplinarity ‘in general’ will al-
ways work. Whether a particular interdisciplinary approach will actually solve a particular 
complex problem can be decided only with hindsight. The situation for the supporters of 
interdisciplinarity, therefore, is akin to the situation of the defenders of Galileo’s mathema-
tization during their dispute with the Aristotelians, when they found themselves defending 
a method which had not been demonstrated to be successful. Similarly, since it is so diffi-
cult to assess its future merits, the discourse surrounding interdisciplinarity is steeped of 
rhetorical elements.
Epideiectic strategies are used in some high-level policy reports from funding agencies, 
in which the value of interdisciplinarity and a sympathetic attitude toward it seem to be 
taken for granted. For example, in the already mentioned report of the NAS, it is claimed, 
in a rather triumphalist way, that interdisciplinarity
1 The scientific revolution which took place through Galileo’s mathematization is a massive topic in the 
history and philosophy of science. Additional studies addressing the changing disciplinary landscape 
at Galileo’s time are developed by, among the others, Dear 1995, 2011; Lennox 1986; Mancosu 
1996. In any case, it is worth specifying that the present paper is not about Galileo. Rather, Biagioli’s 
interpretation of Galileo is here used to assess the extent of the assess the extent of the (alleged) 
revolutionary change that contemporary interdisciplinary would bring into science.
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can be one of the most productive and inspiring of human pursuits—one that provides a for-
mat for conversations and connections that lead to new knowledge. As a mode of discovery 
and education, it has delivered much already and promises more–a sustainable environment, 
healthier and more prosperous lives, new discoveries and technologies to inspire young minds, 
and a deeper understanding of our place in space and time. [...] Interdisciplinary research and 
education are inspired by the drive to solve complex questions and problems, whether gener-
ated by scientific curiosity or by society, and lead researchers in different disciplines to meet at 
the interfaces and frontiers of those disciplines and even to cross frontiers to form new disci-
plines. (NAS 2005, 16)
In another report, this time of the National Science Foundation (NSF), interdisciplinarity 
seems to be the panacea capable of solving pretty much all the ills of the world.
From global sustainability to renewable energy to the origins of life in the cosmos to forecast-
ing and potentially mitigating economic upheavals, the largest scientific challenges—and those 
that may hold the greatest opportunity for transformative technological solutions into the 21st 
century—are interdisciplinary in nature. The skills required from a new generation of trained sci-
entists and engineers to address these challenges have been and continue to be broadly discussed 
and debated. (NSF 2008, 7)
Sometimes, the rhetoric surrounding interdisciplinarity may also take moralistic tones: not 
to engage in interdisciplinarity—and, therefore, not to engage in the structural changes of 
academia interdisciplinarity may lead to—is considered to be just ‘wrong’. At the begin-
ning of an article published in The Scientist, Khan (1994) claims that, in order to solve the 
most pressing problems, interdisciplinary research must be considered as a scientific as well 
as social imperative. Khan spends the rest of the article examining how the potential ob-
stacles to interdisciplinarity can be overcome. In particular, he targets the structure of aca-
demia and the basic funding mechanisms. Similarly, Nicolescu (2002) criticizes the current 
academic system, which can be ‘nationalistic’, ‘feudalistic’ and ‘protectionist’, and argues 
that its barriers can be broken through interdisciplinarity.
Finally, it is not too difficult to see that one of the reasons for supporting interdisci-
plinarity could be the desire of recognition of some existing professional groups and the 
emergence of new ones. It is often argued that the resolution of complex, real-world prob-
lems requires the integrated effort of both the natural and the social sciences, the bound-
aries of which should be ‘re-configured’ (Barry and Born 2013). Apart from solving some 
problems, such a reconfiguration would also give more prominence to those working in the 
social sciences as well as in the arts and humanities. To echo Biagioli, the legitimation of a 
new way of doing science may require revolutions in the social hierarchy of disciplines and 
the emergence of new socio-professional groups.
All in all, it looks like the talk about contemporary interdisciplinarity and the talk 
about a new method capable of bringing a revolutionary change in our conception of sci-
ence share many similarities. There are, however, some important dissimilarities which de-
serve to be analyzed and discussed. The aim of such an analysis is not to show that contem-
porary interdisciplinarity is not like the type of revolutionary changes discussed by Kuhn or 
Biagioli after all. Rather, the analysis of the analogies and disanalogies between interdisci-
plinarity and scientific revolutions is used to illuminate up to which point interdisciplinary 
science does represent a fundamental change in science.
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5. Beyond the social and rhetorical elements of the talk about interdisciplinarity
In the previous section, I explained how, following Biagioli, in some scientific revolu-
tions professional motivations, rhetorical manoeuvres and epistemic elements are all inter-
twined. The communicative isolation into which the members of a scientific group force 
themselves, driven by some rhetorical strategies, and characterised by the refusal of engag-
ing with the competitors, allows them to reflect on, and refine, their group commitments. I 
also claimed that the talk about contemporary interdisciplinarity is characterized by a rhet-
oric akin to that driving and facilitating some types of revolutionary scientific change. It re-
mains to be seen whether the rhetoric surrounding the talk about interdisciplinarity serves 
the same function as the rhetoric driving some episodes of revolutionary scientific change.
To begin with, it should be wondered whether the supporters of contemporary inter-
disciplinarity agree on what the interdisciplinary method is supposed to be.
On the one hand, however, the actors of interdisciplinarity (i.e., scientists doing inter-
disciplinary research) are not always very clear on the methodologies they employ. As ob-
served by Robertson et al. (2003), for example,
while the desiderability of interdisciplinary inquiry has been widely acknowledged, indeed has be-
come ‘the mantra of science policy’, the methods of interdisciplinary collaboration are opaque to 
outsiders and generally remain underdescribed. Many have analysed interdisciplinarity, especially 
in relation to the creation of new disciplines and institutions. [...] Still, there currently persists a 
silence about the methods of interdisciplinary collaboration itself. (Robertson et al. 2003, 21)
On the other hand, the analysts of interdisciplinarity (i.e., historians, sociologists and phi-
losophers of interdisciplinary science) do not agree on whether such a method exists, or 
even whether it would be desirable to find it.
Some of them attempt to provide prescriptive rules for interdisciplinarity. Newell 
(2007), for example, lists a series of necessary steps to solve complex problems which, 
jointly considered, should constitute the interdisciplinary method. The first steps of 
Newell’s list—such as ‘defining the problem’, ‘determining the relevant disciplines for solv-
ing it’ and ‘gathering all relevant disciplinary knowledge’—are taken from a disciplinary 
perspective. The second set of steps—i.e., ‘identifying conflicts’, ‘resolving conflicts by cre-
ating a common ground’ and, indeed, ‘creating a common ground’—are proper of the in-
terdisciplinary research.
An issue with Newell’s prescriptions for interdisciplinarity is that, when looked at in 
enough depth, every item in his list is hugely problematic. For example, in the context of 
interdisciplinarity, something like his first step—‘defining the problem’—is not immediate 
or methodologically innocent. As pointed out by Alvargonzález (2011), in fact, problems 
are formulated from within disciplines which are ‘operationally closed’ around theories, 
principles and material objects (i.e., experimental devices). Different disciplines may de- 
fine the same problem in different ways. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether prob-
lems could be defined from a discipline-free perspective. Other steps in Newell’s list, such 
as ‘resolving conflicts by creating a common ground’, are the very problems that interdisci-
plinarity should solve. In short, it looks like Newell’s tells us what to do, but not how to do 
it. Or, more polemically put, he tells us what the problems of interdisciplinarity are, with-
out indicating a way for solving them.
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Bammer (2013), who is also concerned by the lack of an accepted methodology for in-
tegrating disciplines in order to solve complex-problems, envisions a new field of research, 
called Integration and Implementation Sciences. One of the chief projects that such a new 
field should conduct is, in Bammer’s view, the creation of a global database collecting all 
the instances of successful interdisciplinary research. By developing such a Big-Science/Big-
Data project, some sort of pattern followed by successful interdisciplinary research should 
emerge.
Other analysts of interdisciplinarity, however, question the very possibility of establish-
ing, once and for all, what the ‘method of interdisciplinarity’ is. Krohn (2010), for example, 
argues that the study of interdisciplinarity should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Study-
ing examples of successful interdisciplinary research, however, would not lead to the recog-
nition of some general rules for interdisciplinarity, as Bammer would contend. This is be-
cause, for Krohn, each of such cases is self-contained and, therefore, it cannot be thought of 
as an ‘exemplar’ for interdisciplinary practice in general. In Krohn’s view, therefore, look-
ing at many cases of interdisciplinarity can facilitate the acquisition of tacit skills, habits 
and intuitions, but does not lead to the discovery of ‘the’ method of interdisciplinary re-
search.
Something similar is also argued by Frodeman (2014), for whom interdisciplinarity 
does not require fixed rules and specific methodologies, but it is more a matter of scientists’ 
virtues, such as “the openness to new perspective, a willingness to admit the inadequacies 
of one’s own point of view, to be wrong and to play the fool, and generosity in interpreting 
the position and motives of others.” (Frodeman 2014, 48). In his view, trying to uncover 
the general rules and methods of interdisciplinarity is a residual of the traditional tendency 
to create disciplines with relatively stable and well defined boundaries. But the aim of inter-
disciplinarity is precisely breaking such boundaries. Therefore, it would be contradictory 
to capture the essence of interdisciplinarity but putting interdisciplinarity itself within the 
boundaries of a new discipline. For Frodeman, therefore, the temptation to ‘disciplinize in-
terdisciplinarity’, à la Bammer, should be avoided at all costs.
In short, the supporters of interdisciplinarity do not seem to agree on the existence of 
a method of interdisciplinary research, nor do they seem to agree on whether such an issue 
should be investigated at all.
When it comes to the types of problems to be solved, it looks like there is a general 
consensus about the fact that contemporary interdisciplinarity is useful to solve ‘complex 
problems’, or ‘real-life problems’, or ‘big challenges’—or all of these things. It is however 
unclear whether such ‘complex problems’ or ‘big challenges’ can be solved at all. As Hans-
son (1999) (maybe rhetorically) asks, “[d]o we really think that their scale, complexity and 
level of difficulty are such that they can be solved in the foreseeable future, if even by a gi-
gantic, concentrated, cooperative effort?” (Hansson 1999, 342-343). 
Similarly, Alvargonzález (2011) questions whether the problems interdisciplinarity is 
called to solve are scientific problems to begin with. In his view, “the assumption that these 
problems have a scientific solution (in post-normal science or in future unified transdisci-
plinary science) may be an illusion” (Alvargonzález 2011, 401).
In the end, problems about the definition of the kind of problems to be solved and 
of how to solve them go hand in hand with the problem of the method(s) of interdis-
ciplinarity. Without an agreed upon method, or set of methods, for posing and solving 
problems, it may not always be clear when, and if, a problem has actually been solved at 
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all. Indeed, one of the issues associated with the practice of interdisciplinarity is the dif-
ficulty of assessing its outcomes. As Klein claims, “[c]riteria for judgement constitute the 
least understood aspect of interdisciplinarity, in part because the issue has been the least 
studied and in part because the multiplicity of tasks seems to militate against a single 
standard” (Klein 1996, 210).
In concluding this section, a few remarks are in order. Despite its inherent problems 
and difficulties, it is not claimed here that interdisciplinarity is useless and should not be 
pursued at all. Against such an overly-critical position, one could easily respond by examin-
ing the motivations behind interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinary research is not motivated 
only by the inherent complexity of the world or by the problems arising at the boundaries 
of different disciplines. Some of its drivers, such as the need solve societal problems and the 
challenges and possibilities created by new technologies, may be of a more praxeological na-
ture (NSF 2008, 26-40).
Furthermore, although interdisciplinarity may not be able to solve all the pressing and 
urgent problems the world is facing, it can try, at least, to ameliorate the current situation. 
An absolutely ‘right’ (but late) solution to some problems may be the enemy of the good: 
waiting to gain the true knowledge of the fundamental levels of reality could be unwise. As 
Frodeman (2014) would say, relying on the knowledge produced by traditional disciplines 
may simply be unsustainable. Nevertheless, although many things about it can be appre-
ciated, it does not mean that interdisciplinarity is problem free and philosophical analysis 
should uncover and discuss such problems.
Finally, it must be stressed that objections to interdisciplinarity are not uncommon. 
Indeed, many of such criticisms are developed in the light of some of the issues discussed 
above—i.e., the problem of whether there is a general method of interdisciplinarity, the 
problem of how to assess the outcome of interdisciplinary research, and so on. However, it 
must be specified that this section was not about the criticisms to interdisciplinarity moved 
from outside the community of its supporters. Rather, this section discussed the lack of a 
consensus on some foundational issues within such a community. As it will be clarified in 
the next section, this is one of the main differences between scientific revolutions and in-
terdisciplinarity.
6. Interdisciplinarity: in search of a paradigm?
Contemporary interdiscipinarity is sometimes compared to scientific revolutions—clearly, 
not to intra-disciplinary revolutions, such as the Chemical Revolution, or the transi-
tion from Newton’s classical mechanics to Einstein’s relativity in physics but, rather, to a 
kind of change affecting the whole hierarchy of science, as the emergence of the Galilean 
method. As in those episodes, the talk about interdisciplinarity is characterised by a sort of 
‘anti-disciplinarian’ rhetoric. The value of interdisciplinarity is often assumed rather than 
proven, and its necessity in the faces of complex problems and big challenges can be de-
fended on moral grounds.
There is, however, an important difference between scientific revolutions and interdis-
ciplinarity. During a scientific revolution, rhetorical and epistemological elements go hand 
in hand. In these cases, rhetoric may function as an isolating mechanism: dismissing the 
competitors’ views through rhetorical manoeuvres may allow the members of a community 
 Vincenzo Politi
248 Theoria, 2019, 34/2, 237-252
to focus on their own paradigm, in order to develop and strengthen it. In the case of inter-
disciplinarity, however, it seems that, behind its anti-disciplinarian rhetoric, there is no real 
consensus among its supporters on how the ‘new’ science should look like. One could even 
say that the ‘post-normal science’ Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) talk about is actually in its 
‘pre-paradigmatic’ phase: the interdisciplinary paradigm is still a work in progress.
It may be argued that what the present analysis shows is just that, despite the way it 
is often characterized, interdisciplinarity is not like a Kuhnian revolution after all. This 
would be a problem only if the universal validity of the Kuhn’s model of science is taken for 
granted, and only if Kuhnian revolutions are considered to be the only important scientific 
changes worth of discussion. But one can just disagree with Kuhn and, therefore, character-
ise the change that interdisciplinarity may bring into science in different terms. The main 
aim of this paper, however, is not to determine whether contemporary interdisciplinarity 
is actually an instance of Kuhnian revolutions. Rather, the analogy with Kuhnian revolu-
tions is used to examine some feature of interdisciplinarity. That behind the rhetorics of in-
terdisciplinarity there is a lack of agreement about its methods and the ways of assessing its 
problem-solving power, in fact, is a problem for understanding how interdisciplinarity can 
change science and produce a new kind of knowledge in any significant way, no matter how 
such a ‘change’ is described.
It may also be argued that the strength of interdisciplinarity is precisely in the lack of 
a consensus upon a monolithic ‘interdisciplinarity paradigm’. The value of interdisicipli-
narity may be its inherent pluralism, which probably makes it more resilient in the face of 
the complex problems and global challenges it is called to solve. But unbounded pluralism 
poses its problems too, especially when the lines between natural and social sciences, and 
between the sciences and the art and humanities, begins to be reconfigured. It may turn 
out that, while in some cases of revolutionary scientific changes, as the one described by Bi-
agioli, the disciplinary hierarchy of the sciences was altered, what interdisciplinarity aims 
at doing is to wipe out any disciplinary hierarchy of the sciences, or even any idea of what 
counts as ‘scientific’. This is what seems to be argued, for instance, by Nicolescu (2002) 
and, to some extent, by Frodeman (2014). Unfortunately, this is not the place for discuss-
ing this problem, which deserves to be treated separately. It suffices to say that such a view 
may go well beyond the concept of ‘scientific change’.
Finally, what I have analysed in this paper has not much to do with specific interdisci-
plinary collaborations, but more with how interdisciplinarity ‘in general’ is talked about. As 
rightly pointed out by Mäki (2016)
[t]alk about interdisciplinarity is different from interdisciplinarity present in scientific practice. 
The two may be (and often are) out of phase with one another. On the one hand, there is quite 
some empty, pretentious or misguided talk about interdisciplinarity; on the other, ther is much 
unrecognized or misunderstood genuine interdisciplinarity in the actual practice of science. [...] 
The ways in which the two—talk and practice—are connected are to be examined separately. 
Even if different, and sometimes independent, talk and practice share something important in 
common: presently they both grow. (Mäki 2016, 330)
It could be legitimately asked if there is anything regarding the talk about interdisciplinar-
ity, as opposed the actual practice of interdisciplinarity, worth of philosophical discussion. 
One could agree that some of the ways in which the ‘revolutionary’ impact of interdiscipli-
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narity is advertised may blow things out of proportions; yet, at the same time, one could 
also claim that the consequences of such a “pretentious or misguided talk”, if any, are 
negligible.
The talk about interdisciplinarity, however, should not be neglected. As recognised by 
many, interdisciplinarity has become a “mantra”—an expression used, among the others, 
by Metzger and Zare (1999, 642), Robertson et al. (2003, 21) and Klein (2008, 116). 
It would also be possible to characterise interdisciplinarity as a ‘value’ guiding scien-
tists and policy makers in their choice of theories or research project—i.e., a theory or pro-
ject should be chosen over its competitors if its interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity did not 
acquire such a status only on the basis of the success of specific interdisciplinary research 
projects: as a matter of fact, the success of some interdisciplinary research, such as, for ex-
ample, climate science, is highly contested—see, for example, Sarewitz (1996, 68). The talk 
about interdisciplinarity, therefore, may have played a role in the way in which the practice 
of interdisciplinarity is perceived and, also, promoted. More specifically, it may have con-
strained the type of questions one asks about interdisciplinarity.
There are (at least) two types of questions which can be asked about interdisciplinarity 
itself: the how-questions (i.e., “how can we implement or encourage interdisciplinarity?”) 
and the why-questions (i.e., “why should we implement or encourage interdisciplinarity?”). 
It looks like the majority of the actors and the analysts of science are mainly preoccupied 
with the first type of questions: that is, with how interdisciplinarity and interdisciplinary 
integration can be achieved. Often this preoccupation takes the form of sociological anal-
yses of the institutional barriers which may prevent and prevent successful multi- and in-
ter-disciplinary collaborations, with various suggestions on the possible ways for overcom-
ing them.
These how-questions put the horse before the cart. The interest in how to facilitate, 
encourage and achieve interdisciplinarity is driven by the presupposition that interdisci-
plinarity actually works; and, also, that it works better than the scientific research con-
ducted within the boundaries of traditional disciplines. The desirability, effectiveness and 
value of interdisciplinarity seems just to be taken for granted, without further qualifica-
tion. Apart from asking questions about how interdisciplinarity can be facilitated and im-
plemented, interdisciplinarity itself can be (and, maybe, should be) questioned. This can be 
done by changing the type of questions are usually asked about interdisciplinarity. That is, 
by changing the talk about interdisciplinarity.
7. Conclusions
Instead of treating them as uninteresting contingencies or external aspects of the scientific 
enterprise, some philosophers of science have come to accept the idea that sociological and 
rhetorical elements can be part of theories of the rationality of science. For instance, during 
some scientific revolutions, such elements may drive the process of paradigm choice by cre-
ating a communicative divide between the members of two competing socio-professional 
groups. Such a communicative isolation allows the members of each group to think about 
and refine their own paradigm. Sometimes, however, the same rhetorical strategies may be 
an impediment to the development of a paradigm. The validity and necessity of contempo-
rary interdisciplinarity is often taken for granted, but there is still a lack of consensus about 
 Vincenzo Politi
250 Theoria, 2019, 34/2, 237-252
its foundations among its own supporters. The talk about interdisciplinarity may hinder its 
maturation by constraining the type of questions we ask about interdisciplinarity itself.
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